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1. Introduction
It should be noted that from now on ‘the system’ means not the nervous
system but the whole complex of the organism and the environment. Thus,
if it should be shown that ‘the system’ has some property, it must not be
assumed that this property is attributed to the nervous system: it belongs
to the whole; and detailed examination may be necessary to ascertain the
contributions of the separate parts.
W. Ross Ashby, 1952 [1]
An oft repeated aphorism is that the universe is constantly changing and hence that our
world is in a perpetual state of flux. In order to behave intelligently within this varying
natural environment, any organism - be it man, machine or animal - faces the problem
of perceiving invariant aspects of a world in which no two situations are ever exactly the
same. Cartesian theories of perception can be broken down into what Chalmers [4] calls
the ‘easy problem’ of perception - the classification and identification of sense stimuli - and
a corresponding ‘hard problem’ - the realisation of the associated phenomenal state1. The
difference between the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ problems - and an apparent lack of link between
theories of the former and an account of the latter - has been termed the ‘explanatory gap’
[8] and this [unbridgeable] gap is symptomatic of the underlying dualism.
Many current theories of natural visual processes are grounded upon the idea that when
we perceive, sense data is processed by the brain to form an internal representation of the
world. The act of perception thus involves the activation of an appropriate representation.
The easy problem reduces to forming a correct internal representation of the world and
the hard problem reduces to answering how the activation of a representation gives rise to
a sensory experience.
In machine perception progress in solving even the ‘easy’ problem has so far been un-
expectedly slow; typical bottom-up (or data driven) methodologies involve the processing
of raw sense data to extract a set of features; the binding of these features into groups
then classifying each group by reference to a putative set of models. Conversely, in top
down methods, a typical set of hypotheses of likely perceptions is generated; these are then
compared to a set of features in a search for evidence to support each hypothesis.
1David Chalmers introduced the term ‘hard problem’ to investigate“Why is all this [neural] processing
accompanied by an inner life?” [4]; we deploy the phrase ‘hard problems of consciousness’ to additionally
encompass related problems pertaining to Levine’s ‘explanatory gap’.
To date successes in machine perception have been limited to a relatively small subset
of the possible [human] perceptual gamut. Hence, at this 50th Anniversary Convention of
the AISB, AI once again finds itself, pace Dreyfus [6], at something of a branch point; a
choice, not as Dreyfus imagined in 1988, between ‘making a mind’ or ‘modelling the brain’,
but a choice at a much more fundamental level between neo-classical paths (e.g. GOFAI;
connectionism; dynamic theories of mind; swarm intelligence etc) that are fundamentally (i)
dualist and (ii) essentially formal and representational2, and the more radical ‘Embodied,
Embedded, Ecological, Enactivist’ - the so called ‘4Es’ - framework.
In this context, it is a particular delight that at this golden anniversary convention of
the AISB both paths towards AI are well represented: the ‘classical’ approaches being
championed by symposia such as: Computational Creativity; Computational Intelligence;
Computational Scientific Discovery; and Evolutionary Computing ; and the 4Es being cham-
pioned by symposia such as: Varieties of Enactivism; Consciousness without inner models;
Reconceptualising mental illness, and Embodied Cognition, Acting and Performance.
The foundations of classical AI are by now very well known; the foundations of the 4Es
approach perhaps a little less so, therefore a few words of contextualisation may be helpful.
Rooted at the heart of the emerging 4Es framework is [radical] enactivism; a theoretical
approach to understanding the mind proposed by Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela,
Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. In contrast to classical computational (cognitivist)
or bottom-up (cybernetic) approaches to machine intelligence, the emerging enactivist
framework emphasises the way that organisms and mind organise themselves by interacting
with their environment.
At a fundamental level, enactivism is anti-dualist: the self arises as part of the process of
an embodied entity interacting with its umwelt in precise ways determined by its physiology.
In this sense, individuals can be seen to “grow into”, or arise from, their interactions with
the world. The self does not represent the world, but produces it through the nature of its
unique way of interacting with its environment3.
One particular ‘variety of enactivism’ is sensorimotor theory and we are fortunate at the
AISB50 convention to host one of its founders - Kevin O’Regan - leading both a symposium
on Consciousness without inner models and presenting at several symposia. Contemporary
Sensorimotor Theory [3] offers a new enactive approach4 to perception that emphasises the
role of motor actions and their effect on sensory stimuli. The seminal publication that
launched sensorimotor theory is the target paper co-authored by J. Kevin O’Regan and
2In describing a symbol, representation or process as purely formal, I mean both that it has no intrinsic
content (semantics/meaning), and that it is ‘hardware independent’.
3Francisco Varela defined the term, “to evoke the view that what is known is brought forth, in contra-
position to the more classical views of either cognitivism or connectionism”.
4The term ‘enactive approach’ is taken from Noe¨ [10] where he states, “What I call here the enactive
approach was first presented in [11]. I refer to the view as the sensorimotor contingency theory. Hurley
and I, in joint work, deploy another term: the dynamic sensorimotor account. I borrow the term enactive
from Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson (Varela, Thompson and and Rosch 1991 [13]), although I may
not use it in exactly their sense. I use the term because it is apt, and to draw attention to the kinship of
our view and theirs.”
Alva Noe¨ and published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) for open peer commentary
in 2001 [11].
In the central argument of their paper, O’Regan and Noe¨ suggest radically shifting the
nexus of research in visual perception away from analysis of the raw visual patterns of
stimulation, to refocus on the law-like changes in visual stimulation brought about as a
result of an agent’s actions in the [light-filled] world. In so doing it shifted the problem
of vision away from that of construction of rich internal representations of an ‘out there’
world, to that of active exploration of the environment ‘on demand’; conscious experience
being brought forth via a series of [saccadic] movements that either confirm (or disabuse)
the notion that the world actually is of the form currently anticipated.
In contrast to classical approaches to cognition and AI, O’Regan and Noe¨’s sensorimotor
theory - and more broadly enactivism in general - potentially account for why our conscious
experience of the world appears to us as it does; if correct this is a significant achievement
and one that may offer new insight into at least some of the hard problems of consciousness5.
It is not coincidental that the keynote speakers at AISB50 will offer talks presenting new
insights on both approaches: emerging from the classical branches of AI, John Barnden will
be presenting the first public lecture (on Tuesday 1st April) entitled Creative Metaphor,
Mind Out! Or Rather, Mind In. John Barnden is Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the
University of Birmingham where his research is concerned with investigating how humans
perform complex tasks and how to engineer artefacts to do them. John’s core research
stems from classical approaches to Natural Language Processing, where he is particularly
engaged in understanding the reasoning structures needed for the processing of metaphori-
cal utterances; figurative language more generally, and specifically in metonymy. A parallel
research interest concerns the question of how to reason uncertainly about mental states
such as belief, especially when nested (beliefs about beliefs, etc.). Together with John
Holyoak, John Barnden edited the third volume in the series ‘Advances in Connectionist
and Neural Computation Theory’, Analogy, Metaphor, and Reminding.
The second evening public lecture, The Painting Fool: Weak and Strong Computational
Creativity Research in Action, will be presented by Simon Colton. Simon is Professor of
Computational Creativity at Goldsmiths, University of London. Computational Creativity
is a sub-area of Artificial Intelligence research, which involves the study of software that
can take on some of the creative responsibility in arts and science projects. At Goldsmiths
Simon heads the Computational Creativity group - one of the largest AI research groups
specialising in the computational modelling of creative processes. Simon is the driving
force behind “thepaintingfool.com” - an artificial intelligence that he hopes will one day be
accepted as an artist in its own right.
The third public lecture stems from collaboration between ‘The AISB’, Dr. Kate Devlin
(Goldsmiths) and ‘The Colour Group of Great Britain’; a collaboration6 that resulted in
5E.g. In part it was this new, enactive, theory of visual perception that prompted AISB collaboration
with ‘The Colour Group’ (Great Britain) on the symposium New perspectives on colour.
6To emphasise this new collaboration, as the outgoing Chair of the AISB, I have been invited to present
an address entitled The Colour of Cognition which highlights some problems of colour perception that
present particular challenges to classical Artificial Intelligence.
the launch of a new AISB symposium entitled New perspectives on Colour. To celebrate,
closing the AISB50 Convention on Friday evening, Dr. Hannah Smithson (Oxford) will be
presenting a special lecture entitled New perspectives on colour from a 13th century account
of light, material and rainbows.
The opening conference plenary address is scheduled for the morning session of April 1st.
For this lecture the AISB is delighted to welcome Professor Susan Stepney from the Uni-
versity of York, UK, who will be asking When does a slime mould compute? Susan’s work
in non-conventional computing sits somewhere between classical and the 4Es approaches
to Artificial Intelligence and emphasises the importance of the physical embodiment of the
computational substrate. Susan’s work presents such non-standard computation in con-
trast to ‘standard’ or ‘classical’ computation, by which she means the classical Turing/Von
Neumann perspective. In this way Susan’s work suggests a stepping stone towards the rad-
ical ideas of our third plenary speaker Professor Terrence Deacon (University of California,
Berkeley).
The second convention plenary on the morning of Wednesday 2nd April is from Professor
Lucy Suchman (Lancaster) who will be presenting a lecture entitled Human(oid) Robot
Reconfigurations. With over 8,500 Google Scholar citations for her seminal work Plans
and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-machine Communication. Lucy needs no
introduction to those interested in foundational issues in Human Computer Interaction and
Artificial Intelligence. In groundbreaking work Lucy fundamentally challenges common
assumptions behind the design of interactive systems, with an incisive anthropological
argument that human action is constantly constructed and reconstructed from dynamic
interactions with the material and social worlds; as such it relates to the ‘embedded (or
‘situated’) theory of cognition (which emphasises the importance of the environment as an
integral part of the cognitive process) and the broader 4Es approach.
Professor Terence Deacon’s (Berkeley) recent high-profile monograph Incomplete Na-
ture fundamentally challenges naive classical approaches to intelligence and cognition and
in so doing it has won high praise from all quarters; perhaps most surprisingly from the
philosopher Daniel Dennett. Over his lifetime Dennett has been a stalwart champion of
computational theories of cognition against what he somewhat derisorily labels its ‘roman-
tic challengers’7, so on the surface it appears something of a volte face to read his praise
of Deacon’s book promoting “romantic” (contra ‘mechanistic theory of the body and du-
alistic theory of the mind’) cognitive science: “Deacon, with his more ambitious exercise
of reconstruction, has me re-examining my fundamental working assumptions” [5]. In his
plenary at AISB50 Terry promises to outline a new vision for a ‘living machine’ as one that
instantiates principles of autogenesis - in which multiple self-organizing processes are linked
by virtue of each producing the critical boundary constraints that maintain the others.
The final convention plenary Ethical dilemma of the AnthropoRobotic is from Professor
Humberto Maturana (Instituto de Formacin Matriztica, Chile). Maturana first came to
7For the ‘romantic side’ Dennett claims “Romanes and Baldwin, Kropotkin, Stephen Jay Gould, Hum-
berto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Stuart Kauffman, Roger Penrose, Ilya Prigogine, Rupert Sheldrake, and
the philosophers John Haugeland, Evan Thompson, Alicia Juarrero, John Searle, and - off the map, now -
Jerry Fodor and Thomas Nagel” [5].
international fame with the 1959 paper “What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain” [7] one
of the most cited papers in the Science Citation Index. Over seven decades Humberto’s
research has touched on cybernetics, languaging, autonomy and enactivism and extends
to philosophy, cognitive science and even family therapy. These days, however, along
with with his protege Francisco Varela, Humberto is perhaps best known for his work on
autopoiesis [9] - a groundbreaking thesis about the nature of reflexive feedback mechanisms
in living systems that led them both to conclude: “Living systems are cognitive systems,
and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms,
with or without a nervous system”.
Flagged-up by the seven keynote talks, the A-Eye Computer Art exhibition and the
theatrical premiere of MIL-STD-1815 8, the twenty-four symposia that comprise this 50th
convention offer a unique, exciting and celebratory snap-shot of Artificial Intelligence at
the golden anniversary party of the AISB.
Acknowlegements. Elements of this introduction were extracted from Bishop & Nasuto
[2] and Bishop [3]. In editing this celebratory volume Symposium Chairs were asked to
nominate two papers, not because in some way represented ‘the best’ of their event, but
because they offer up an interesting flavour of the material being discussed; we hope you
share our excitement in reading them.
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8A new theatre production connecting thoughts, ideas and biography relating to Alan Turing, Ada
Lovelace, Charles Babbage and Snow White.
